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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
  On June 5, 2012, Appellant James Edward Pender
1
 pleaded guilty to one count of 
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 846.  The District Court sentenced Pender to 292 months’ 
imprisonment on October 2, 2012.  Pender challenges that sentence.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.    
I.  Background 
 On June 23, 2011, Pender was charged with conspiracy to distribute and 
possession with intent to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin.  Pender executed a 
written plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of the indictment.  
The District Court accepted the guilty plea on June 5, 2012. 
 In preparation for sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a final 
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”).  The PSR calculated Pender’s total offense 
level as 35: 
 A base offense level of 34 because the offense involved at least 3 
kilograms, but fewer than 10 kilograms, of heroin, pursuant to U.S.S.G.     
§ 2D1.1(c)(3); 
 
                                              
1
 Pender had his name legally changed to “Jabbar Pender.”  The District Court filed an 
amended judgment of conviction on December 15, 2012, reflecting Pender’s legal name. 
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 A four-level adjustment because Pender was an organizer or leader of a 
criminal activity that involved five or more participants, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a); and 
 
 A three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 
 
The PSR classified Pender as a “career offender” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on 
two predicate violent felonies.  The PSR described how Pender participated as the 
getaway driver in an armed bank robbery in 1993.  After the armed robbery took place in 
New York, Pender and his cohorts participated in a 30-mile car chase and shootout with 
police that ended in New Jersey.   
 As a result of his participation in the 1993 bank robbery, Pender was sentenced on 
April 15, 1994, in the Southern District of New York, to a term of 111 months’ 
imprisonment and a 5-year term of supervised release for bank robbery, armed bank 
robbery, conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, and use of a firearm during a crime 
of violence.  Then, on March 30, 1995, Pender was sentenced in the State of New York 
for criminal possession of a weapon for his participation in the car chase and shootout in 
New York.  Finally, on July 24, 1996, Pender was sentenced in the State of New Jersey 
for aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a weapon, possession of a weapon, and 
eluding, for his participation in the car chase and shootout in New Jersey.  In calculating 
Pender’s criminal history, the PSR counted each of these convictions as separate.  
Additionally, the PSR determined that the federal armed bank robbery conviction in the 
Southern District of New York and the New Jersey aggravated assault conviction were 
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predicate convictions for the career offender enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.               
§ 4B1.1(b).   
 The District Court conducted a sentencing hearing on October 2, 2012, during 
which Pender challenged his designation as a career offender, urging the District Court to 
treat his convictions as “related” and not “separate,” and argued that low recidivism rates 
counseled towards a reduced sentence.  Ultimately, the District Court concluded that the 
career offender designation was applicable, noting that the bank robbery and subsequent 
shootout constituted two separate offenses.  The District Court calculated an Offense 
Level of 35 and a Criminal History Category of VI, which resulted in a Guidelines range 
of 292 to 365 months.  The District Court then sentenced Pender to 292 months’ 
incarceration and five years of supervised release, as well as 6 months’ imprisonment, to 
be served concurrently, for his violation of supervised release. 
 Pender’s challenge to his sentence is currently before us. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 We review a district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion in two stages.  First, 
we review for procedural error—for example, failing to correctly compute the Guidelines 
range.  United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011).  We exercise plenary 
review over a district court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines, although 
“we review determinations of fact for clear error, and . . . give due deference to a district 
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court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts.”  United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 
381, 386 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 “If there is no procedural error, the second stage of our review is for substantive 
reasonableness, and ‘we will affirm [the sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the 
district court provided.’”  Wright, 642 F.3d at 152 (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
III.  Discussion 
 Pender raises two issues on appeal: (1) that the District Court committed a 
procedural error by improperly characterizing him as a “career offender” for purposes of 
the Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) that the District Court’s sentence was substantively 
unreasonable. 
A.  Career Offender 
 Pender argues that the District Court erroneously concluded that he was a “career 
offender” within the meaning of the Guidelines because his predicate convictions should 
have been counted as one conviction, not two.  Under the Sentencing Guidelines: 
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at 
least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed 
the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of 
conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at 
least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense.   
 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  To determine whether to treat prior convictions as separate, the 
Guidelines state: “If there is no intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted separately 
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unless (A) the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging 
instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the same day.”2  U.S.S.G.                     
§ 4A1.2(a)(2). 
 In this case, where there was no intervening arrest, Pender was charged in two 
separate indictments and sentenced on two different days.  The language of the 
Guidelines is unambiguous: § 4A1.2(a)(2) mandates that Pender’s prior convictions be 
treated as separate.  Pender recognizes as much in his brief.  Indeed, he does not dispute 
that § 4A1.2(a)(2) applies—rather, he argues that “[i]t is not fair that crossing over an 
arbitrary [state] line should have such severe repercussions as Pender has experienced in 
this case.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 11.)  Pender’s approach would ignore the plain language 
of the text, however, which we refuse to do.  See United States v. Jones, 698 F.3d 1048, 
1050-51 (8th Cir. 2012) (refusing to treat “inextricably intertwined” offenses as a single 
sentence because they were prosecuted in different jurisdictions and sentenced on 
different days).   
 Accordingly, we will not disturb the District Court’s determination that Pender is a 
career offender. 
B.  Sentence 
                                              
2
 This language was added to the Guidelines in 2007 by Amendment 709.  Prior to the 
amendment, the Guidelines specified that to determine whether a defendant was a career 
offender, prior felony convictions were to be counted separately unless they were 
“related.”  Under that framework, “prior sentences [were] considered related if they 
resulted from offenses that (A) occurred on the same occasion, (B) were part of a single 
common scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or sentencing.”  U.S.S.G. 
App. C, vol. III, at 236.  Amendment 709 removed the concept of “related” cases. 
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 Pender also argues that his 292-month sentence is substantively unreasonable 
because it is greater than necessary in light of his low possibility of recidivism.  Given 
that the District Court’s sentence was procedurally sound, we will affirm it “unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  
“Ultimately, the touchstone of ‘reasonableness’ is whether the record as a whole reflects 
rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.§ 3553(a) . . 
. [, which] gives district courts broad latitude in sentencing.”  Id. (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).   
 Looking at the record before us, it is clear that the District Court was guided by 
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.  The District Court considered recidivism among those 
factors, although it was “not one of the prime factors.”  (App. 32.)  The fact that the 
District Court treated recidivism as a lesser factor than Pender would have does not make 
it an abuse of discretion, however.  Moreover, the District Court carefully considered 
Pender’s conduct, his attitude, the scope of the criminal enterprise, the particular facts of 
the crime, and Pender’s background.  Having considered the § 3553(a) factors and 
Pender’s arguments, the District Court sentenced Pender to the bottom of the advisory 
Guidelines range.  Cf. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 2006) (“A 
sentence that falls within the guidelines range is more likely to be reasonable than one 
outside the guidelines range.”).  Based on the record, we cannot say that “no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
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the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  Thus, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Pender. 
IV.  Conclusion 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence of the District Court. 
